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Abstract
A seminal result of Bulow and Klemperer [1989] demonstrates the power of competition for
extracting revenue: when selling a single item to n bidders whose values are drawn i.i.d. from
a regular distribution, the simple welfare-maximizing VCG mechanism (in this case, a second
price-auction) with one additional bidder extracts at least as much revenue in expectation as
the optimal mechanism. The beauty of this theorem stems from the fact that VCG is a prior-
independent mechanism, where the seller possesses no information about the distribution, and
yet, by recruiting one additional bidder it performs better than any prior-dependent mechanism
tailored exactly to the distribution at hand (without the additional bidder).
In this work, we establish the first full Bulow-Klemperer results in multi-dimensional envi-
ronments, proving that by recruiting additional bidders, the revenue of the VCG mechanism
surpasses that of the optimal (possibly randomized, Bayesian incentive compatible) mechanism.
For a given environment with i.i.d. bidders, we term the number of additional bidders needed
to achieve this guarantee the environment’s competition complexity.
Using the recent duality-based framework of Cai et al. [2016] for reasoning about optimal
revenue, we show that the competition complexity of n bidders with additive valuations over m
independent, regular items is at most n + 2m − 2 and at least log(m). We extend our results
to bidders with additive valuations subject to downward-closed constraints, showing that these
significantly more general valuations increase the competition complexity by at most an additive
m − 1 factor. We further improve this bound for the special case of matroid constraints, and
provide additional extensions as well.
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1 Introduction
A great deal of research in recent years has been devoted to the design of simple mechanisms,
motivated in part by their desirability in practical settings [see 15, 44, 39, 40, and many subsequent
works]. Different measures of mechanism complexity have been considered, including computa-
tion and communication complexity, as well as the simplicity of the mechanism’s description, and
its dependence on details of the economic environment. This last measure is motivated by early
work that has come to be known as Wilson’s doctrine [64], by which simple detail-free mechanisms
should be preferred in complex settings in order to alleviate the risks introduced by various as-
sumptions. Indeed, Wilson considered the “progress of game theory” to depend on freeness from
such assumptions.
This idea is reflected in the distinction between prior-independent and prior-dependent mech-
anisms. In both cases it is assumed that there exist populations (prior distributions) from which
the bidders are drawn. The difference is that prior dependent mechanisms are custom-made to
these priors, the details of which are assumed to be fully known. By contrast, the designer of a
prior-independent mechanism assumes no knowledge of these priors. In terms of practical applica-
bility, prior-dependent mechanisms risk overfitting to particular beliefs, whereas prior-independent
mechanisms are inherently robust.
Of course, if we could get exactly the same guarantees from prior-independent mechanisms as
prior-dependent ones (as is the case for welfare maximization by the VCG mechanism [62, 22, 37]),
we would simply demand that all mechanisms be prior-independent. But this is provably not the
case for revenue optimization, where the best prior-dependent mechanisms strictly outperform the
best prior-independent ones (as is the case for Myerson’s mechanism [52]). So the game becomes
to understand the tradeoff between simplicity and optimality. One approach in this direction that
has achieved remarkable success in the past decade is to apply the lens of approximation, and
address questions of the form: “what fraction of the optimal revenue can be achieved by a ‘simple’
mechanism?” [59, 15, 44, 17, 18, 29, 56, 46, 39, 2, 47, 3, 31, 58, 5, 66, 19, 36].1
While these works certainly offer an explanation for the ubiquity of simple mechanisms in
practice, they don’t quite tell the whole story. The lens of approximation views the environment
as fixed, and tries to find a suitable auction that generates as much revenue as possible. But in
some settings, particularly in high-stakes markets where small constant fractions amount to large
losses, constant-factor approximation guarantees – even with matching impossibility results – may
be unsatisfactory. However, once we enter the realm of practically-motivated questions, there’s no
reason to view the environment as fixed – the seller could, for instance, spend additional effort
recruiting extra bidders to attend the auction instead of treating the number of participants as
given. Indeed, a typical economist might (reasonably) demand the optimal revenue and settle for
nothing less, and instead pose the question as seeking the minimum cost change to the environment
so that a simple mechanism achieves this guarantee.
A beautiful result in this spirit is the Bulow-Klemperer (BK) theorem [8], which asserts that
in the sale of a single item to n symmetric bidders, whose valuations are drawn from the same
(regular) distribution, running the (simple and prior-independent) VCG mechanism (second-price
auction in this case) with n + 1 bidders extracts at least as much revenue in expectation as My-
erson’s optimal (prior-dependent) mechanism with n bidders. The beauty of this theorem stems
from the fact that VCG is a simple and standard mechanism, completely oblivious to the bidder
distribution, yet by recruiting a single additional bidder, its revenue surpasses that of the optimal
auction. The original BK result was made possible by the work of Myerson [52], thanks to which
1Some of these works study prior independence [59, 44, 29, 56, 2, 31, 36], and others propose mechanisms that
are inherently simple and robust, such as “sell each item separately.”
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revenue optimization is extremely well-understood in single-dimensional settings. In contrast, rev-
enue optimization is extremely poorly-understood in multi-dimensional settings, even with additive
bidders (at least until recently), owing to complicating factors such as randomization [61, 53, 7, 40],
non-monotonicity [41], computational intractability [24, 21, 20], and other factors which do not arise
in single-dimensional settings [54, 25, 26, 35, 34].
BK results and competition complexity. In this paper, we establish the first full BK results
for a wide range of multi-dimensional settings. By full BK results, we mean theorem statements of
the form “the revenue of mechanism M with n+ C symmetric bidders drawn from any population
F is at least as large in expectation as the optimal revenue with n bidders, as long as F satisfies
condition X”,2 where: (a) M is simple and prior-independent – and in this paper we further restrict
to M = VCG as in the original BK result, (b) the revenue of M is required to surpass the optimal
revenue without additional bidders (no approximation loss whatsoever), and (c) the optimal revenue
refers to the optimum among all, possibly randomized, Bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) and
Bayesian individually rational (BIR)3 mechanisms.4
For the minimum C such that a full BK statement holds for an environment (number of bidders
n, number of items m, class X of valuations and distributions), we say that the environment has
competition complexity C. The competition complexity thus measures how much competition is
needed before the revenue of a simple mechanism reaches a strong revenue benchmark. Competition
complexity complements in a sense the measure of sample complexity [23, 45, 49, 55, 51, 50, 30],
which measures how much data is needed before the revenue of a (non-simple) mechanism approx-
imates a benchmark.
1.1 Our Results and Techniques
Before we state our results, we remark that it is not even a priori clear that any number of additional
bidders suffices to reach the optimal revenue (rather than just approximate it). In fact, without
an independence assumption on the bidders’ distributions, already there exist distributions over
additive valuations for two items for which the revenue of VCG with any (finite) number of bidders
never surpasses the revenue of the optimal mechanism for just one bidder (this result is a direct
corollary of [40]5).
We consider the following distributions over valuation functions v: For every item j, vj is inde-
pendently drawn from a distribution Fj , and for every set of items S, v(S) = maxT⊆S,T∈I{
∑
j∈T vj},
for some downward-closed set system ([m], I). Such valuations are called “additive subject to
downward-closed constraints I, with independent items.” When all Fj are regular, we say “inde-
pendent, regular items”. For example, when I = 2[m], v is just an additive valuation function. We
also consider extensions where the constraints I are themselves randomly drawn (independently of
item values), and in such instances replace “downward-closed constraints I” with “randomly drawn
downward-closed constraints”.
2Note that X encompasses both the class of valuations of the bidders, and typically also independence and
regularity conditions on their distribution.
3BIC means that it is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium for all bidders to bid their true value. BIR means that agents’
expected utility in this equilibrium is non-negative.
4This is in contrast to the work of [56] which uses a strictly lower benchmark, namely, the optimum among all
deterministic DSIC mechanisms. More on this in Section 1.2.
5When bidders’ values are correlated, [40] shows there can be an infinite gap between the revenue of the optimal
randomized mechanism and the optimal deterministic one, even with one bidder and two items. This implies there
cannot be a finite bound on the competition complexity since the revenue of VCG from each item is bounded by the
optimal revenue for each item, which is a concave function of the number of bidders by revenue submodularity [32].
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Theorem: We obtain the following competition complexity results:
• The competition complexity of n bidders with additive valuations over m independent, regular
items is at most n+ 2(m− 1) and at least Ω(logm).
• The competition complexity of n bidders with additive valuations subject to downward-closed
constraints I over m independent, regular items is greater than the competition complexity of
n additive bidders over m independent, regular items by at most m−1. There exist constraints
for which this is tight.6
• For all matroid set systems ([m], I), the competition complexity of n bidders with additive
valuations subject to matroid constraints I over m independent, regular items is greater than
the competition complexity of n additive bidders over m independent, regular items by at most
ρ, where ρ is the maximum number of disjoint independent sets in I that span (but do not
include) item j, over all items j. There exist constraints for which this is tight.
• The competition complexity of n bidders with additive valuations subject to randomly drawn
downwards-closed constraints over m independent, regular items is greater than the competition
complexity of n additive bidders over m independent, regular items by at most 2(m− 1).
A direct implication of the above theorem is that the competition complexity of n bidders with
additive valuations subject to downward-closed constraints over m independent, regular items is at
most n+3(m−1) and at least m−1. Note that for k-uniform matroids, ρ = m−k , and so ρ = m−1
for unit-demand valuations (and ρ = 0 for additive valuations). The final bullet accommodates
markets where, for instance, bidders are equally likely to be additive or unit-demand, independently
of their values.
Our techniques. At a high level, our approach breaks down into three steps: (1) Find a suitable
upper bound on the optimal revenue for many additive bidders, using the duality framework of [13].
(2) Prove that, for additive bidders, VCG with additional bidders surpasses this benchmark, using
coupling arguments and probabilistic tools. (3) Prove a “reduction” from arbitrary downward-
closed set systems to additive bidders, at the cost of m− 1 additional bidders.
Step One: Revenue Upper Bound. While we make use of the duality framework developed
in [13], the upper bounds they derive for additive bidders provably don’t suffice for our goals.
Specifically, for a single additive bidder and any C > 0, there exists a distribution that is additive
over two independent, regular items where the revenue of VCG with C+ 1 bidders does not exceed
their bound (the example appears in Section 3.1). So our first step is to provide a new bound
(still using their framework) that is suitable for our setting. Without getting into much detail, our
bound can be viewed as taking a similar approach to theirs, but in “quantile space” as opposed to
“value space.” That is, whenever their approach compares two random variables by their value,
we instead compare them by their quantile.7 We postpone further details to Section 3.3, but note
here that we do expect our approach to be useful for future BK results, and multi-dimensional
mechanism design in general.
Step Two: Covering with Extra Bidders. After finding a suitable bound, we need to show
that the revenue of VCG with additional bidders surpasses this bound. The key tools here are
6In fact, regularity can be replaced here (and in the next item) with any property X of one-dimensional distribu-
tions.
7The quantile of a random variable X drawn from distribution with CDF F is F (X).
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coupling arguments between random variables representing the revenue of VCG with additional
bidders and the random variable from Step One.
We wish to highlight the unique challenge in targeting a full BK result as opposed to an ap-
proximation, and postpone the details of the argument to Section 4. Whereas in single-dimensional
settings, a closed formula for the optimal revenue is well-understood, the optimal revenue in multi-
dimensional settings is the expectation of an extremely bizarre random variable. Any tractable
bound on the optimal revenue is therefore necessarily loose, meaning that one needs to be extra
careful so as to avoid sacrificing constant-factors. Moreover, all known bounds (including ours,
and others from Cai et al.’s framework) are still not “obviously” simple to analyze. To simplify
the analysis at the cost of constant-factors, one can upper bound maximums by sums, indicator
random variables by 1, etc. For instance, the now-standard “core-tail” decomposition follows from
a sequence of operations like this. But since we want a full BK result, these simplifications are too
lossy, necessarily complicating the analysis.
As a (surprisingly relevant) example, consider two random variables X and Y with the same
expectation, and imagine that we wish to design an auction that gets revenue at least E[max{X,Y }].
If we are willing to lose a factor of two, we can simply design an auction that gets revenue at least
E[X] = E[Y ] and be done. But if we really refuse to lose constant factors, we’re forced to design a
better auction.8
Step Three: Reduction from arbitrary downward-closed feasibility constraints to addi-
tive bidders. While we believe our result for additive bidders is already exciting in its own right,
we are able to extend it to far more general settings by reduction. More specifically, we first show
that the revenue of the optimal mechanism for additive bidders upper bounds the optimal revenue
for bidders who are additive subject to any downward-closed constraints (assuming item values are
drawn from the same distributions). From here, we show that the revenue of VCG with η +m− 1
bidders who are additive subject to downward-closed constraints is at least as large as the revenue
of VCG with η additive bidders (assuming item values are drawn from the same distributions).
Chaining these inequalities together, we conclude that the competition complexity increases by at
most m− 1 relative to additive bidders. Note that a similar result of [56] for unit-demand bidders
can be naturally extended (with some work) to additive bidders subject to matroid constraints,
but an entirely new combinatorial approach is necessary for arbitrary downward-closed constraints,
and this result may be of independent interest. Moreover, this reduction now allows future research
to focus exclusively on improved BK results for additive bidders, as they will immediately extend
far more generally.
Computational remarks. It is well known that running VCG for the most general environments
where our results hold is NP-hard (see, e.g., [63]). Still, we wish to note the following:
• Even our result on additive bidders is the first full BK result beyond single-dimensional settings,
and VCG can be implemented in poly-time in this setting, in fact whenever the feasibility
constraints form a matroid.
• Even in environments where it is NP-hard to implement VCG, competition complexity is a
meaningful measure in its own right.
• The settings that motivate full BK results versus approximations may be exactly those where
practitioners find a way to solve NP-hard problems – high stakes instances where anything less
8Incidentally, we’ll encounter this exact obstacle with X = the “highest virtual value” and Y = the “second-highest
value.” Both E[X] and E[Y ] capture the expected revenue of a second-price auction, but it’s not obvious how one
should design an auction achieving revenue E[max{X,Y }]. See Section 4.
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than the optimum is unsatisfactory.
The above bullets explain why it is important to understand the competition complexity of
VCG, even when it is computationally intractable. Still, we provide additional competition com-
plexity results in Appendix D.1 for a computationally efficient maximal-in-range (MIR) mechanism.
Specifically, we show that the MIR mechanism that optimizes over the space of matchings (which
can be done in poly-time) also witnesses that the competition complexity of n bidders with additive
valuations subject to downward-closed constraints over m independent, regular items is at most
n+ 3(m− 1).
1.2 Related Work
Other BK and Prior-Independent Results. The most related work to ours is [56], which
proves the only previous multi-dimensional BK result. Their result holds only for unit-demand
bidders (again over independent, regular items), and compares to the optimal deterministic, dom-
inant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) mechanism,9 where bounds on the optimal revenue
are known due to [17]. Due to the weaker benchmark, they are able to bound the competition
complexity as m, which is tight.
Variants of BK results in single-dimensional settings are established in [44, 32]. There is now a
rich literature on prior-independent mechanisms in both single- and multi-dimensional settings [59,
29, 1, 2, 31, 36]. Recently, a growing literature is also considering mechanism design with limited
samples from the population (whereas prior-independent mechanisms get zero samples) [e.g., 23, 30].
In comparison to the present paper, all of these results either study single-dimensional settings, or
incur some approximation loss.
Related Techniques. As already discussed, we use the recent duality framework of [13] to
develop our revenue upper bounds. In concurrent work, the same framework is utilized to prove
approximation results for simple mechanisms in settings with many “XOS bidders over independent
items” [14], a single bidder with values that exhibit “limited complementarity” (by the present
authors) [33], and dynamic auctions [48]. So step one of our approach bears similarity to the
comparable steps in these works, but each work addresses unrelated problems with techniques
specific to the problem at hand. It is also worth noting that [13] “merely” provides a framework
for deriving upper bounds on the attainable revenue, and not the upper bound to be used always.
Indeed, judging by recent applications of their framework, even selecting the appropriate bound for
a given setting seems to be a bit of an art itself (although the approach across different works is of
course similar).
Related Themes in TCS. BK results resemble in spirit ideas from “beyond worst-case com-
plexity”, and in particular the concept of resource augmentation, where the idea is to compare the
performance of an algorithm that is endowed with more resources to an optimal outcome in an
environment with less resources. Examples of such results (which are also referred to as bicriteria
results) appear in online paging [60], network routing games [57], truthful job scheduling [16], and
buffer management [4].
9A mechanism is DSIC if it is in ever bidder’s interest to tell the truth, no matter what the other bidders report. It
is known that BIC mechanisms can strictly outperform the best randomized, DSIC mechanism in multi-dimensional
settings [65].
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1.3 Organization.
Preliminaries appear in Section 2. Section 3.1 is a warm-up section in which we address a single
additive bidder and symmetric items (whose values are drawn i.i.d. from a single distribution).
This simple case presents a key idea, which guides us to develop a new duality-based upper-bound
in Section 3.3, using the framework of [13]. In Section 4 we present our main results for multiple
additive bidders, and Section 5 generalizes our results to additive subject to feasibility constraints,
with additional generalizations presented in Sections C and D for matroid and asymmetric feasibility
constraints. Section 6 lists open research directions.
2 Preliminaries
There are m heterogeneous items and n bidders. Every item j is associated with a distribution Fj
with support Tj . Each bidder i’s value for item j, vij , is drawn independently from distribution Fj .
Write T = ×j∈[m]Tj and F = ×j∈[m]Fj . Let fj(y) = Prx←Fj [y = x] be the density of Fj and write
f(v) = ×j∈[m]fj(vj). Let ϕj(·) denote Myerson’s virtual value for Fj .10 In this work we assume
that Fj is regular for every j, i.e., ϕj(·) is monotone. We consider bidders that are additive subject
to feasibility constraints. That is, each bidder i has a downward-closed feasibility constraint set
system ([m], Ii), where Ii ⊆ 2[m], and bidder i’s value for a set S (given {vij} and Ii) is
vi(S) = max
T⊆S,T∈Ii
{
∑
j∈T
vij}.
If Ii = I for every bidder i, then we say that bidders are symmetric with respect to their feasibility
constraints. If Ii = 2[m], then bidder i’s valuation is additive. We sometimes refer to additive
bidders as unconstrained bidders.
Let v = (v1, . . . , vn) denote the value profile of the n agents, sampled from F
n.11 Let vj =
(v1j , . . . , vnj) be the values of the agents for item j. Let vi,−j denote the values sampled for agent
i without item j. Given a vector of real values a, let a(i) denote the i-th highest value in a. Let
ϕj(vj)
+ = max{ϕj(vj), 0}. Let IA denote an indicator random variable for an event A.
Auction Design. A mechanism is a pair of an allocation and payment functions. Both are
functions of the submitted bids. We use pi(·) to denote bider i’s (possibly randomized) payment
function. As standard, we study mechanisms that are Bayesian Individually Rational (BIR), i.e.,
mechanisms in which the expected utility of an agent is non-negative, and Bayesian Incentive
Compatible (BIC), i.e., mechanisms where truth-telling maximizes an agent’s expected utility (in
both cases, the expectation is over the randomness of the mechanism and other agents’ valuations
and strategies).
Given a value distribution F , denote by Rev the expected revenue of the optimal BIR-BIC
mechanism; i.e., the mechanism that maximizes Ev∼F [
∑
i∈[n][pi(v)]] over all BIR-BIC mechanisms.
When a single item is for sale, the second price auction with lazy reserves first sets a reserve
prices ri for each bidder i, and then solicits a bid from each bidder. It then allocates the item to
the highest bidder i if its bid surpasses ri, in which case the payment is the maximum over the
second highest bid and ri (if vi < ri, then the item remains unallocated).
10For continuous distributions, ϕj(v) = v − 1−Fi(v)fi(v) .
11For a distribution G, let G` denote ×j∈[`]G.
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Competition Complexity. Let OPT(F, n) denote the revenue of the optimal BIR-BIC mecha-
nism for n bidders with valuations drawn i.i.d. from F . Let also Rev(M,F, k) denote the expected
revenue of mechanism M when played by k bidders with valuations drawn i.i.d. from F . Then
when we use the term “competition complexity,” we formally mean:
Definition 2.1 The competition complexity C with respect to a prior-independent mechanism M
of n bidders and a class of distributions D is the minimum c such that for all F ∈ D, OPT(F, n) ≤
Rev(M,F, n+ c). When M = VCG, we drop “with respect to M”.
Definition 2.2 [Classes of distributions considered.]
• Additive over independent items: A distribution F is additive over m independent items
if there exist one-dimensional distributions F1, . . . , Fm, and drawing {v(·)} ← F amounts to
drawing ~v = (v1, . . . , vm)← ×jFj and setting v(S) =
∑
j∈S vj.
• Subject to constraints I: A distribution F is additive subject to constraints I over m
independent items if there exist one dimensional distributions F1, . . . , Fm, and drawing v(·)←
F amounts to drawing ~v ← ×jFj and setting v(S) = maxT⊆S,T∈I{
∑
j∈T vj}.
• Subject to randomly drawn constraints: A distribution F is additive subject to randomly
drawn constraints over m independent items if there exists a distribution F0 over 2
2[m] (set sys-
tems over [m]), and one-dimensional distributions F1, . . . , Fm, and drawing v(·)← F amounts
to drawing I ← F0, ~v ← ×jFj (independently), and setting v(S) = maxT⊆S,T∈I{
∑
j∈T vj}.
When all referenced Fi are regular, we say “independent, regular items”.
Classic Bulow-Klemperer.
Theorem 2.3 ([8], in the language of competition complexity) The competition complex-
ity of n bidders with valuations for a single, regular item is 1.
Discrete vs. Continuous Distributions. Like [13], we only explicitly consider distributions
with finite support. Like their results, all of our results immediately extend to continuous distri-
butions as well via a discretization argument of [27, 58, 43, 42, 6]. We refer the reader to [13] for
the formal statement and proof.
Tie Breaking. Throughout the paper, we assume that there are no ties in the values of the
agents. If there are ties, we break them lexicographically (first by agent’s i.d., then by item’s i.d.).
With this tie breaking, we can also assume that there exists a unique welfare maximizing allocation
of items to agents — given two allocations with the same welfare, we break ties in the symmetric
difference according to the agent’s i.d. and then the item’s i.d.
Duality Benchmarks. Equation (1) presents the upper bound on Rev from [13] when there is
a single bidder (for details the reader is referred to Appendix A. In particular, Eq. (7)). Let Aj be
the event that ∀j′ 6= j : vj > vj′ and let A¯j be the event that ∃j′ : vj < vj′ , then:
Rev ≤
∑
j
∑
vj
fj(vj)
(
ϕj(vj)
+ · Pr
v−j
[Aj ] + vj · Pr
v−j
[A¯j ]
)
(1)
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3 Warm-up: Single Bidder
In this section, we give an upper bound on the competition complexity of a single additive bidder.
These results will convey intuition regarding the techniques used in proving BK results in more
complex settings, and for the benchmark we will use in order to prove our results.
3.1 Symmetric Items
Consider a single additive bidder, and identically distributed items, i.e., Fj = Fj′ for all j and j
′,
and therefore, ϕj = ϕ for all j. Let
∑
j Myem(j) be the expected revenue from selling each item
separately to m single-parameter i.i.d. bidders using Myerson’s optimal mechanism. We write a
sum over items even though they are identically distributed because in Section 3.3 we describe how
the proof changes when items are not necessarily identically distributed.
Lemma 3.1
∑
j Myem(j) ≥ Rev.
Proof: Consider the following mechanism M for selling item j to m single-parameter i.i.d.
bidders: Run the second price auction with a personal lazy reserve price of ϕ−1(0) only for bidder
j (and a lazy reserve of 0 for all other bidders). Let u denote the value profile of the m bidders.
To analyze the expected revenue of this mechanism we consider the revenue from bidder j — a
random variable denoted by pj(u) — separately from the revenue from the other bidders, denoted
by p−j(u). By the optimality of Myerson’s mechanism, it holds that
Myem(j) ≥ Eu[pj(u)] + Eu[p−j(u)].
We couple u and v by simply setting u = v. Consider first pj(u). By Myerson’s theorem, the
expected revenue from bidder j equals his expected virtual surplus [52]. By our coupling, and
since the items are identically distributed, bidder j is allocated in Mechanism M with precisely
the same probability that event Aj occurs and the bidder’s virtual surplus is non-negative. We get
that Eu[pj(u)] =
∑
vj
fj(vj) · ϕ(vj)+ · Prv−j [Aj ]. Consider next p−j(u). Using the fact that in the
second price auction bidders other than j win whenever event A¯j occurs and pay at least vj , we
have Eu[p−j(u)] ≥
∑
vj
fj(vj) · vj · Prv−j [A¯j ]. Comparing the bounds on pj(u) and p−j(u) summed
over all items to Equation (1) completes the proof.
Corollary 3.2 The competition complexity of a single bidder whose valuation is additive over m
i.i.d. regular items is at most m.
Proof: Consider the revenue of VCG with additional m bidders. By additivity, VCG is separable
over the items, and therefore, the revenue is exactly the sum of second price auctions run for each
item separately with m+1 bidders. By applying the classic Bulow-Klemperer theorem on each item
separately, we get that VCG with m + 1 bidders gives revenue greater than
∑
j Revm(j) ≥ Rev,
where the last inequality follows from Lemma 3.1.
We note that this proof does not extend when the items are not identically distributed. The
reason for this is that now the probability that bidder j wins in the single parameter environment is
not identical to the probability that event Aj happens. In fact, next we present an example where
the previous benchmark used in [13] fails to provide any meaningful bounds on the competition
complexity when items’ values are drawn from different distributions.
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3.2 Example Where the Previous Benchmark Fails
Proposition 3.3 For every C > 0, there exists a value distribution F that is additive over 2 (non-
i.i.d.) independent, regular items, where Rev(VCG, F, C + 1) is less than the benchmark of Cai et
al. [13] for one bidder with valuations drawn from F (Equation (1)).
Proof: Consider a market with a single bidder and only two items. Item a is distributed according
to the equal revenue distribution capped at some value k; i.e.,
Fa(x) =
{
1− 1/x x < k
1 x = k
,
supported on [1, k]. Item b is distributed according to the following CDF: Fb(x) = 1 − 1x−k+1 ,
supported on [k,∞). One can verify that both distributions are indeed regular.
Consider the benchmark (1) proposed by [13], which in the case of two items is interpreted as
the expected virtual value of the item with the highest value of the two plus the expected value
of the item with the lower value of the two. Since item b always has a higher value than item a,
this is exactly the expected virtual value of item b plus the expected value of item a. The expected
value of item a is
∫ k
0
(1− F (x))dx+ k · 1
k
= 1 +
∫ k
1
1
x
dx+ 1 = 2 + ln k.
As for the expected virtual value of item b, one can readily compute that E[ϕb(x)] = k.12 Combining
the expected value of item a and the expected virtual value of item b, we get that the benchmark
is at least 2 + ln k + k.
Now consider running VCG using ` bidders in total (` − 1 additional bidders). Since running
VCG with additive bidders is the same as running VCG for each item separately, we analyze how
much revenue we get by running VCG for each item. We first analyze the revenue from running
Myerson’s optimal mechanism on item a with ` bidders (which is an upper bound on running VCG).
The expected revenue of the optimal single-bidder auction is 1. By revenue submodularity ([32]),
the expected revenue of running the optimal mechanism is a concave function of the number of
bidders. Thus, the expected revenue of the optimal auction with ` bidders is at most `.
We now compute the revenue of the optimal mechanism for item b with ` bidders. For a single
bidder, the optimal mechanism sets a take-it-or-leave-it price of k on the item, and gets an expected
revenue of k. For two bidders, the optimal mechanism is VCG with monopoly reserves. Since the
monopoly reserve is k, this is equivalent to just running VCG. We compute the expected revenue
of VCG the following way — fix bidder 1, and compute her expected payment. Bidder 2’s value
sets a random threshold for bidder 1. If the quantile of bidder 2’s value is q, then the bidder 1’s
expected payment is exactly the probability her value is above v(q) times v(q). This is exactly
R(q). Therefore, the expected payment of bidder 1 is exactly the area under the revenue curve,
which is equal to (k + 1)/2. By symmetry, bidder 2’s expected payment is (k + 1)/2 as well, and
the expected revenue overall is k+ 1. Again, by submodularity of revenue, since the second bidder
adds 1 to the expected revenue, the expected revenue of VCG with ` bidders is at most k + `− 1.
We get that the expected revenue obtained by running VCG on both items with ` bidders
is at most k + 2` − 1. Therefore, ` has to be at least (ln k + 3)/2 = Ω(ln k) in order to cover
12One easy way to shortcut this computation is the apply Myerson’s Theorem (revenue = virtual welfare) and
immediately conclude that E[ϕb(x)] = k · (1− F (k)) = k.
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Figure 1: The revenue curve of distribution Fb used in the example.
the benchmark. Since k can be arbitrary large, this benchmark is not suitable in providing any
meaningful bound on the competition complexity for this market.
3.3 Asymmetric Items
In this section we present a new upper bound on the optimal revenue and demonstrate its applica-
bility by showing that it implies a competition complexity result for the case of asymmetric items
(and an additive bidder).
New Duality-Based Bound: Quantile Based Regions. As previously discussed, the proof
of the case where the items are sampled from the same distribution does not extend when the items
are not i.i.d. The reason is that the probability of the jth sample to be the highest one is not the
same as the probability of bidder j to have the highest value for item j, since the samples of the
bidders’ values for item j are i.i.d., while the values of the single bidder for the different items in
the original scenario are not i.i.d. The intuition behind the new benchmark we use is that we want
to mimic the bidders’ i.i.d. samples, even if the items themselves are not i.i.d.
For each item j, we define item j’s region Rj = {v : ∀j′ 6= j Fj(vj) > Fj′(vj′)}, that is, for each
bidder, region j is defined as the region where the bidder’s value is of the highest quantile according
to the items’ distributions. Using this definition, we give a new upper bound on the revenue.
Theorem 3.4 (New upper bound on Rev) For every product distribution F , and n additive
bidders, whose valuations are sampled i.i.d. from F ,
Rev ≤
m∑
j=1
E
v∼Fn
[
max
i∈[n]
(
ϕj(vij)
+ · Ivi∈Rj + vij · Ivi /∈Rj
)]
. (2)
Let Bj be the event that ∀j′ 6= j : Fj(vj) ≥ Fj′(vj′) and let B¯j be the event that ∃j′ : Fj(vj) <
Fj′(vj′). A direct corollary of Theorem 3.4 gives the following on the revenue from a single bidder.
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Corollary 3.5 For every product distribution F , the revenue of a single additive bidder, whose
valuation is sampled from F , is upper bounded by∑
j
∑
vj
fj(vj)
(
ϕj(vj)
+ · Pr
v−j
[Bj ] + vj · Pr
v−j
[B¯j ]
)
. (3)
Now, one may notice that the probability of event Bj equals exactly the probability that in m i.i.d.
samples from Fj , the jth sample is the highest. The derivation of the new upper bound, which
uses the duality-based framework of [13], and the resulting corollary, are deferred to Appendix A.
In particular, corollary 3.5 stems from Eq. (8).
Application to a Single Additive Bidder, Asymmetric Items. With the new bound in
hand, we show how to sidestep the impossibility result of Proposition 3.3 associated with the upper
bound of [13].
Theorem 3.6 The competition complexity of a single bidder whose valuation is additive over m
independent, regular items is at most m.
Proof: The proof is almost identical to the proof in Section 3.1. We state what changes in the
proof of Proposition 3.1 when we use the upper bound in (3). u is now a vector of i.i.d. draws
from Fj , whereas v is a vector of independent draws from F1, F2, . . . , Fm. We couple u and v so
that Fj′(vj′) = Fj(uj′) for every coordinate j
′. Still, bidder j is allocated in mechanism M with
precisely the probability that event Bj occurs and its virtual value is positive (we are using here
the monotonicity of Fj , i.e., that uj > uj′ for all j
′ 6= j iff Fj(vj) = Fj(uj) > Fj(uj′) = Fj′(vj′) for
all j′ 6= j). And in the second price auction, bidders other than j win whenever event B¯j occurs,
and pay at least vj .
4 Main Result: Bulow-Klemperer for Multiple Additive Bidders
In this section, we are given an instance with n additive bidders and m heterogeneous item, where
bidders’ valuations are drawn i.i.d. from the product of regular distributions F . We show that by
adding n + 2m − 2 bidders and running VCG, we are able to get at least as much revenue as the
optimal obtainable revenue by any BIC mechanism with the original n bidders.
Theorem 4.1 The competition complexity of n bidders with additive valuations over m indepen-
dent, regular items is at most n+ 2m− 2, and at least Ω(logm).
The remainder of this section contains a proof of the upper bound, with some missing proofs of
claims deferred to Appendix B. The lower bound is proved in Appendix E, and makes use of the
same “i.i.d. equal revenue” example from [39].
4.1 An Upper Bound on Item j’s Contribution to the Revenue
Fix some item j, and consider j’s contribution to the upper bound on the revenue given in Eq. (2),
i.e.,
Revj = E
v∼Fn
[
max
i∈[n]
(
ϕj(vij)
+ · Ivi∈Rj + vij · Ivi /∈Rj
)]
.
For a given valuation profile v, let “(i)” be the index of the bidder with the ith highest valuation
for item j. The next key lemma gives a bound on Revj , which is useful in proving our BK result.
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Lemma 4.2 Revj is upper bounded by
E
v∼Fn
[
max
{
ϕj
(
v(1)j
)
, v(2)j
} | v(1) ∈ Rj] · Pr
v∼Fn
[
v(1) ∈ Rj
]
+ E
v∼Fn
[
v(1)j | v(1) /∈ Rj
] · Pr
v∼Fn
[
v(1) /∈ Rj
]
.
Proof: We consider two cases. If, v(1) /∈ Rj , then
v(1)j ≥ vij ≥ ϕj(vij)+ · Ivi∈Rj + vij · Ivi /∈Rj
for every bidder i, and therefore,
v(1)j ≥ max
i∈[n]
(
ϕj(vij)
+ · Ivi∈Rj + vij · Ivi /∈Rj
)
.
On the other hand, if v(1) ∈ Rj , then
max
i∈[n]
(
ϕj(vij)
+ · Ivi∈Rj + vij · Ivi /∈Rj
)
=
max
{
ϕj
(
v(1)j
)+
,max
i 6=(1)
(
ϕj(vij)
+ · Ivi∈Rj + vij · Ivi /∈Rj
)}
≤
max
{
ϕj
(
v(1)j
)+
, v(2)j
}
= max
{
ϕj
(
v(1)j
)
, v(2)j
}
.
We get that
Revj ≤ E
v∼Fn
[
max
{
ϕj
(
v(1)j
)
, v(2)j
} · Iv(1)∈Rj + v(1)j · Iv(1) /∈Rj]
= E
v∼Fn
[
max
{
ϕj
(
v(1)j
)
, v(2)j
} | v(1) ∈ Rj] · Pr
v∼Fn
[
v(1) ∈ Rj
]
+ E
v∼Fn
[
v(1)j | v(1) /∈ Rj
] · Pr
v∼Fn
[
v(1) /∈ Rj
]
. (4)
4.2 A Single Parameter Lemma
In this section we prove our main technical lemma.
Lemma 4.3 Consider the case with a single item for sale and 2n + 2m − 2 bidders whose values
are drawn i.i.d. from Fj. The expected revenue obtained by running VCG (just on item j) is at
least Revj.
We first show that proving this lemma immediately yields a proof for Theorem 4.1.
Proof of Theorem 4.1 (based on Lemma 4.3): For additive bidders, running VCG is equivalent
to running VCG on each item separately. Applying Lemma 4.3, we get that
Rev ≤
m∑
j=1
Revj ≤
m∑
j=1
E
vj∼F 2n+2m−2j
VCG(vj) = E
v∼F 2n+2m−2
VCG(v).
In proving Lemma 4.3, we make use of the following property of VCG, which is folklore knowl-
edge (proof appears in Appendix B for completeness):
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Observation 4.4 (Folklore) Consider a set of bidders drawn i.i.d. from a regular distribution
and a single item for sale. The optimal mechanism that always sells an item is the VCG mechanism.
In order to prove Lemma 4.3, we introduce a mechanism for selling a single good to a set of
2n+2m−2 bidders drawn from Fj , and show that the expected revenue of this mechanism is at least
the bound on Revj in Eq. (4). Moreover, this mechanism always sells the item, and therefore, by
Observation 4.4, VCG gets at least as much revenue, so a bound on the revenue of this mechanism
is sufficient to prove Lemma 4.3. Our single-item mechanism, SingleParam-j, is given in Fig. 2.
SingleParam-j
Input: 2n+ 2m− 2 bids sampled i.i.d. from distribution Fj .
1. Consider the bidders in some arbitrary, predetermined order. Rename the bidders as follows:
(a) Rename the first n bids to u(1)j , u(2)j , . . . , u(n)j , where u(i)j is the ith highest bid of the
first n bids. Let uj denote this n-dimensional vector.
(b) Rename the next m − 1 bids to u(1)1, u(1)2, . . . , u(1)j−1, u(1)j+1, . . . , u(1)m according to
their arbitrary order. Let u(1)−j denote this (m− 1)-dimensional vector.
(c) Rename the last n + m − 1 bids to w(1)j , w(2)j , . . . , w(n+m−1)j , where w(i)j is the ith
highest bid of the last n+m−1 bids. Let w denote this (n+m−1)-dimensional vector.
2. Let j′ ← arg maxk 6=ju(1)k.
3. If u(1)j′ > u(1)j :
• Allocate the item to u(1)j′ .
4. Else:
(a) If ϕj
(
u(1)j
)
> w(2)j :
• Allocate the item to u(1)j .
(b) Else:
• Allocate the item to w(1)j .
5. Charge the winner according to Myerson’s payment identity.
Figure 2: A single parameter mechanism with expected revenue at least Revj .
We first note that mechanism SingleParam-j is truthful since the allocation of every bidder
is monotone in the bidder’s valuation [52]. Before giving the full proof of Lemma 4.3, we give
the intuition. The trick is trying to couple the various events v(1) ∈ Rj , ϕj(v(1)j) > v(2)j , etc.
that affect the random variable related to Revj (Eq. (4)) with events that determine the different
cases in the mechanism SingleParam-j. The reader can get a good idea for which events will be
coupled based on our decision for how to allocate the item in SingleParam-j. However, the complete
analysis is a bit subtle and in particular requires the following probabilistic claim (proof appears
in Appendix B.1) in addition to the proper coupling.
Claim 4.5 For any regular distribution F ,
E
a∼F `
b∼Fk
[
max
{
ϕ
(
a(1)
)
, a(2)
} |a(1) > b(1)] ≤ E
a∼F `
b∼Fk
c∼F `+k
[
max
{
ϕ
(
a(1)
)
, c(2)
} |a(1) > b(1)] .
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Note that in the LHS above, the random variables a(1) and a(2) are correlated, but come from
` bidders. In the RHS, a(1) and c(2) are independent, but c comes from `+ k bidders. We proceed
to prove our main technical lemma.
Proof of Lemma 4.3: Consider the values vj and v(1)−j in the upper bound of Revj in Eq.
(4) and uj and u(1)−j as defined in the renaming phase of SingleParam-j. Couple the values when-
ever vj = uj and Fj′(v(1)j′) = Fj(u(1)j′) for every j
′ 6= j. To see that this is a valid coupling, observe
that both vj and uj are vectors of n i.i.d. samples from Fj , and that Fj′(v(1)j′) and Fj(u(1)j′) are
sampled uniformly over the interval [0, 1] for all j′, independent from other samples.
We next analyze the expected revenue obtained by SingleParam-j. For the bidders in uj ,
we compute their expected virtual value, and for the other bidders, we compute their expected
payment. We distinguish between two cases:
Case (1): u(1)j′ > u(1)j for some j
′ (the condition checked in step 3 of the mechanism). In this
case the item goes to some bidder u(1)j′ . Since bidder u(1)j′ pays the minimum value at which she
is allocated, her payment is at least u(1)j . The probability for this case is
Pr
u(1)−j∼Fm−1j
uj∼Fnj
[∃j′ : u(1)j < u(1)j′] = Pr
u(1)−j∼Fm−1j
uj∼Fnj
[∃j′ : Fj(u(1)j) < Fj(u(1)j′)]
= Pr
v(1)−j∼F−j
vj∼Fnj
[∃j′ : Fj(v(1)j) < Fj′(v(1)j′)]
= Pr
v∼Fn
[
v(1) /∈ Rj
]
,
where the second equality follows from the coupling and the last equality follows from the definition
of Rj and the independence of the samples.
Case (2): u(1)j′ < u(1)j for all j
′. This event happens with the complementary probability of Case
(1), which is Prv∼Fn
[
v(1) ∈ Rj
]
. In this case, the winner is determined according to the condition
in Step 4a of our mechanism. I.e., if ϕj
(
u(1)i
)
> w(2)j , then the winner is bidder u(1)i; otherwise
(
if
ϕj
(
u(1)i
)
< w(2)j
)
, the winner is w(1)j , and by the payment identity, her payment is at least w(2)j .
Combining the two cases, the expected revenue of SingleParam-j is at least
E
u(1)−j∼Fm−1j
uj∼Fnj
[
u(1)j | ∃j′ 6= j : u(1)j < u(1)j′
] · Pr
v∼Fn
[
v(1) /∈ Rj
]
+ E
u(1)−j∼Fm−1j
uj∼Fnj
w∼Fn+m−1j
[
ϕj
(
u(1)j
) · Iϕj(u(1)j)≥w(2)j + w(2) · Iϕj(u(1)j)<w(2)j | ∀j′ 6= j : u(1)j > u(1)j′] · Prv∼Fn [v(1) ∈ Rj] .
We bound each summand of the bound above separately. For the first summand, we have
E
u(1)−j∼Fm−1j
uj∼Fnj
[
u(1)j | ∃j′ 6= j : u(1)j < u(1)j′
]
= E
u(1)−j∼Fm−1j
uj∼Fnj
[
u(1)j | ∃j′ 6= j : Fj
(
u(1)j
)
< Fj
(
u(1)j′
)]
= E
v(1)−j∼F−j
vj∼Fnj
[
v(1)j | ∃j′ 6= j : Fj
(
v(1)j
)
< Fj′
(
v(1)j′
)]
= E
v∼Fn
[
v(1)j | v(1) /∈ Rj
]
,
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where the second equality follows by the coupling, and the last equality follows by the definition of
Rj and the independence of samples.
For the second summand, we first notice that ϕj
(
u(1)j
) · Iϕj(u(1)j)≥w(2)j +w(2) · Iϕj(u(1)j)<w(2)j =
max
{
ϕj
(
u(1)j
)
, w(2)
}
. We have
E
u(1)−j∼Fm−1j
uj∼Fnj
w∼Fn+m−1j
[
max
{
ϕj
(
u(1)j
)
, w(2)
} | ∀j′ 6= j : u(1)j > u(1)j′]
≥ E
u(1)−j∼Fm−1j
uj∼Fnj
[
max
{
ϕj
(
u(1)j
)
, u(2)j
} | ∀j′ 6= j : u(1)j > u(1)j′]
= E
v(1)−j∼F−j
vj∼Fnj
[
max
{
ϕj
(
v(1)j
)
, v(2)j
} | ∀j′ 6= j : Fj (v(1)j) > Fj′ (v(1)j′)]
= E
v∼Fn
[
max
{
ϕj
(
v(1)j
)
, v(2)j
} | v(1) ∈ Rj] ,
where the inequality follows Claim 4.5, the first equality follows by the coupling and the last equality
follows by the definition of Rj and the independence of samples.
Consequently, the revenue of SingleParam-j is at least
E
v∼Fn
[
v(1)j | v(1) /∈ Rj
] · Pr
v∼Fn
[
v(1) /∈ Rj
]
+ E
v∼Fn
[
max
{
ϕj
(
v(1)j
)
, v(2)j
} | v(1) ∈ Rj] · Pr
v∼Fn
[
v(1) ∈ Rj
]
,
which is greater than Revj according to Lemma 4.2. Since Revj is a mechanism that always sells
the item, applying Observation 4.4 completes the proof of Lemma 4.3.
5 Generalizations: Additive Subject to Downward-Closed
In this section we generalize our results beyond additive bidders, to bidders whose valuations are
additive subject to downwards-closed constraints. In Section 5.1 we consider distributions where
the constraints are fixed for the entire distribution, and downwards-closed. In Section 5.3, we state
the following extensions (all proofs are in the appendix):
• In the special case that the constraints are matroids, we obtain improved guarantees on the
competition complexity (Theorem 5.6, proved in Appendix C).
• In the case that the constraints themselves are part of the distribution (“additive subject to
randomly drawn downward-closed constraints”), we obtain slightly weaker guarantees (The-
orem 5.7, proved in Appendix D).
• Finally, we extend our results to the competition complexity with respect to a poly-time
maximal-in-range mechanism. This complements our results with respect to VCG in settings
for which VCG cannot be implemented in poly-time (Theorem 5.8, proved in Appendix D.1).
5.1 Symmetric General Downward-Closed Constraints
In this section, the bidders have valuations that are additive subject to identical downward-closed
feasibility constraints, represented by the set system ([m], I). We can assume without loss of
generality that for every item j, {j} ∈ I. Our main result in this section is the following:
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Theorem 5.1 (Competition complexity for downward-closed) Let the competition complex-
ity of n additive bidders over m independent, regular items be X = X(n,m). Then the competition
complexity of n additive bidders subject to downward-closed constraints I over m independent reg-
ular items is at most X +m− 1.
Theorem 5.1 relies on the Lemma 5.2 below. Corresponding lemmas for matroids and asym-
metric feasibility constraints appear in Appendices C and D, respectively (in particular, Lemmas
C.2 and D.1). To state our main lemma we use the following notation: fix a product of m regular
distributions F ; let VCGAddn denote the expected VCG revenue from selling the m items to n ad-
ditive bidders whose values are i.i.d. draws from F ; let VCGDCn′ denote the expected VCG revenue
from selling them to n′ ≥ n bidders with i.i.d. values drawn from F , whose valuations are additive
subject to n′ identical downward-closed feasibility constraints. Intuitively, if n′ ≈ n, the expected
revenue from VCG with the n unconstrained bidders is higher than the revenue from VCG with
the n′ constrained bidders, since in the former all bidders compete for all items. Lemma 5.2 gives
a bound on how much larger n′ should be relative to n such that this intuition ceases to hold.
Lemma 5.2 (Main lemma for downward-closed) VCGDCn+m−1 ≥ VCGAddn .
The proof of Lemma 5.2 appears in Section 5.2. This lemma can be thought of as quantify-
ing the extra competition complexity required due to the feasibility constraints of the bidders (in
comparison to unconstrained additive bidders), and is the main technical hurdle in proving The-
orem 5.1. At a high level, the proof is as follows: First, observe that however VCG decides to
allocate the items, it always has the option to reallocate item j to a bidder who currently receives
nothing. So whoever receives item j pays at least the highest value for item j among all bidders
who receive nothing, and the trick is comparing this random variable with n+m−1 bidders to the
second-highest value from n bidders. Due to the potential complexity of arbitrary downward-closed
feasibility constraints, the random variable denoting the highest value for item j among bidders
who receive nothing depends quite intricately on the values of all bidders for all other items, and
one cannot reason about this random variable with the same Greedy-type arguments one might use
for feasibility constraints that are matroids, and a more careful combinatorial argument is required
instead. Given Lemma 5.2 (proved shortly), we can prove the main theorem of this section:
Proof of Theorem 5.1: Fix a product of regular distributions F , and a downward-closed feasibil-
ity set system. We use the following notation: let RevAddn denote the optimal expected revenue that
can be achieved from selling the m items to n additive bidders whose values are i.i.d. draws from
F , and let RevDCn denote the optimal expected revenue from selling them to such bidders whose
valuations are subject to the downward-closed constraint. Note first that for every feasibility set
system, RevAddn ≥ RevDCn . This follows from the following three facts:
• Without loss of generality, the optimal mechanism for agents subject to downwards-closed con-
straints I only allocates sets in I.
• The designer of a mechanism for additive bidders is free to restrict herself to allocating only
sets in I.
• Subject to this restriction, it is immaterial whether a bidder is additive or additive subject to
I.
So in particular, there exists an optimal mechanism for bidders constrained by I that is truthful
for unconstrained bidders, and the optimal mechanism can only get better.
By our assumption that the competition complexity of additive bidders is X = X(n,m), we
know that VCGAddn+X ≥ RevAddn . We can now apply Lemma 5.2 to get VCGDCn+X+m−1 ≥ VCGAddn+X .
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Putting everything together,
VCGDCn+X+m−1 ≥ VCGAddn+X ≥ RevAddn ≥ RevDCn .
We have shown that the competition complexity of additive bidders subject to downward-closed
constraints is X +m− 1, and this completes the proof of Theorem 5.1.
5.2 Proof of Main Lemma (5.2) for Downward-Closed
We first introduce a lemma that gives a lower bound on the revenue of VCG with bidders subject
to identical downward-closed constraints.
Lemma 5.3 Consider a set of bidders with identical downward-closed feasibility constraint, and
the outcome of VCG. For each item j, let v∗j be the highest value of an unallocated bidder for item
j (a bidder that does not receive any item). The revenue of VCG is at least
∑
j∈[m] v
∗
j .
Proof: Recall that in the VCG mechanism, each bidder pays his externality on the environment;
i.e., the difference in welfare of other bidders when he is not allocated and we he is. Let A and
A¯ = [n] \ A be the respective sets of allocated and unallocated bidders. Fix a bidder i ∈ A, and
let Si be the feasible set of items he receives in VCG. Let W be the welfare of the VCG outcome.
The welfare of all bidders but i for this allocation is W − vi(Si).
Consider now the following allocation — allocate the items not in Si as in the allocation of the
VCG mechanism, and distribute the items in Si among the unallocated bidders, where each item
j ∈ Si is allocated for a bidder i′ ∈ A¯ that has value v∗j for item j. Notice that since the bidders
allocated items in Si receive subsets of a feasible set of items, their allocation is also feasible
due to the downward-closedness of the feasibility set. The welfare of the purposed allocation is
W − vi(Si) +
∑
j∈Si v
∗
j . Since we described some allocation of items to all bidders but i, the welfare
of the optimal allocation to bidders without i is at least as high. We get that the payment of bidder
i is at least
∑
j∈Si v
∗
j . Summing over all bidders completes the proof of the lemma.
Our goal is to show that VCGDCn+m−1 ≥ VCGAddn . Recall that with additive bidders, VCG
decomposes over the items. Therefore, VCGAddn is the sum of expected revenues obtained from
selling every item j separately to n single-parameter bidders, whose i.i.d. values are drawn from
Fj , using the VCG auction (in this case VCG is equivalent to the second-price auction). To prove
the lemma it is thus sufficient to show that for every item j, the expected revenue from selling
j separately to n single-parameter bidders – i.e., the expectation of the second highest among n
i.i.d. random samples from Fj , denoted by E[u(2:n)j ] – is at most the expected payment for item j
in VCG with n+m− 1 constrained bidders (the contribution of selling item j to VCGDCn+m−1).
In the remainder of the proof we shall argue that in VCG with n+m− 1 constrained bidders,
there are always at least n bidders whose values for item j are i.i.d. draws from Fj , such that at
most a single bidder from this set can be allocated. Since by Lemma 5.3, the payment for item j
is at least the highest value for j among the unallocated bidders. This will show that the expected
payment for j is ≥ E[u(2:n)j ], completing the proof.
From now on, fix an item j, and fix the values of the n+m−1 constrained bidders for all items
but j. Consider the welfare-maximizing allocation of all items but j to the n+m− 1 bidders. We
denote this allocation by OPT−j , and the set of allocated bidders by A. Clearly since we have
allocated m− 1 items, |A| ≤ m− 1, and |A¯| = n+m− 1− |A| ≥ n (where A¯ = N \A). We notice
the following:
Claim 5.4 If item j is allocated to an bidder i ∈ A¯, no other bidder in A¯ is allocated an item.
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Proof: We argue that if j is allocated to an bidder i ∈ A¯, the allocation of all other items in OPT
is identical to their allocation in OPT−j , and so precisely one bidder in A¯ is allocated by VCG, as
required. Items are allocated as in OPT−j due to the downward-closedness of the constraints on
the bidders’ additive valuations; we now show that assuming otherwise leads to a contradiction:
Consider the allocation OPT−j , and assume for contradiction that after a bidder i ∈ A¯ is allocated
item j, to get to allocation OPT we need to perform additional reallocations of items. Since we
can assume there’s a unique optimal allocation (as described in Section 2), this means that we need
additional reallocations to get to the optimal welfare. Because valuations are additive subject to
downward-closed constraints, if we can increase the total welfare by item reallocations when bidder
i has item j, we can get the same increase in welfare by these reallocations when bidder i does not
have item j. This contradicts the optimality of OPT−j , and completes the proof of the claim.
We now further fix the values of the bidders in A for item j, so that all remaining randomness
is in the values of the bidders in A¯ for item j. The information we currently have allows us to
compute an optimal allocation if in the optimal allocation j is allocated to an bidder i ∈ A. We
denote this allocation by OPTj∈A. More importantly, it lets us identify a set of bidders in A¯ of size
at least n− 1 which will not be allocated if j will be allocated to an bidder in A.
Claim 5.5 Before sampling the values of item j for set A¯, one can identify a set A˜ ⊆ A¯ such that
|A˜| ≥ n− 1, and none of the bidders in A˜ will be allocated in case item j is allocated to an bidder
in A in OPT.
Proof: Whenever j is allocated to some bidder i ∈ A, OPT is OPTj∈A. As mentioned above,
OPTj∈A can be computed, even though we do not know the value of item j to bidders in A¯, simply
compute the welfare-maximizing allocation in which j is allocated to a bidder in A. We will now
prove the existence of n− 1 unallocated bidders from A¯ in OPTj∈A.
Our proof is by the following charging argument: We show a chain of reallocations which starts
from allocation OPT−j and leads to allocation OPTj∈A, and argue that it ends with at least n− 1
bidders in A¯ unallocated. Start with bidder i ∈ A who gets item j in OPTj∈A. We say bidder i
vacates an item j′ if j′ is allocated to i in OPT−j but not in OPTj∈A; we say bidder i snatches an
item j′ if j′ is not allocated to i in OPT−j but i adds it to his allocation. Let i vacate and snatch
items until i’s allocation reaches his allocation in OPTj∈A. To continue the chain we place the
following bidders from A into a “queue” (provided that they are not already in the queue): those
from whom i snatched an item and those who end up grabbing an item that i vacated. Importantly,
when a bidder i′ enters the queue, there is a unique item to which his entrance can be charged :
either an item that was snatched from him by i, or an item that i vacated and he grabbed.
We now take the next bidder from the queue and repeat the process (letting this bidder vacate
and snatch items until he reaches his allocation in OPTj∈A, and placing bidders in the queue as
described above), until the queue is empty. Notice that by the assumption of a unique optimal
allocation, each bidder from A not entered to the queue has the same allocation in OPTj∈A and
OPT−j . This is true since items of such an bidder are not snatched by bidders in A¯; otherwise,
this would contradict OPT−j ’s optimality.
We use this chain of reallocations to show a one-to-one mapping from bidders in A\{i} to items
that are allocated to bidders in A both in OPT−j and OPTj∈A. The mapping is as follows:
• Each bidder who is entered to the queue since an item of his was snatched by a different bidder
in A is mapped to a snatched item.
• Each bidder who is entered to the queue since he grabbed a vacated item is mapped to an item
he grabbed.
• Each bidder in A \ {j} not entered to the queue is mapped to an item allocated to him.
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This mapping implies bidders in A have at least |A| items allocated to them in OPTj∈A — item j
is allocated to bidder i ∈ A, and all other bidders are mapped to a distinct item that is allocated to
a bidder in A. This implies that we have at most m− |A| items allocated to A¯ in OPTj∈A. Since
|A¯| = m+ n− 1− |A|, it must hold that n− 1 bidders from A¯ are unallocated in OPTj∈A.
Using the two claims above, we can now prove Lemma 5.2.
Proof of Lemma 5.2: Let A˜ ⊆ A¯ be a set of n − 1 bidders as guaranteed to exist by Claim
5.5. If |A˜| < n, take an arbitrary bidder i′ from A¯ \ A˜ and add him to A˜ (such an bidder is
guaranteed to exist since |A¯| ≥ n as mentioned above). We now have a set of at least n bidders
whose value for item j is yet to be sampled. The values of these bidders for item j are i.i.d. draws
from Fj , as required (this is known as the principle of deferred decision).
To complete the proof, we now claim that at most one of the bidders from A˜∪ {i′} is allocated
in OPT. We consider two cases — If j is allocated to an bidder in A¯, then by Claim 5.4, this is
the only bidder from A¯ who is allocated an item in OPT, and therefore, the claim follows. If j
is allocated to and bidder in A, then by Claim 5.5, all bidders in A˜ that are different from i′ are
unallocated in OPT, and the claim follows. This implies that the payment for item j in VCGDCn+m−1
is at least the second highest of n i.i.d draws from Fj , exactly the payment for item j in VCG
Add
n .
This completes the proof of the lemma, and therefore, of Theorem 5.1.
5.3 Extensions
For the special case that the constraints are a matroid, we obtain improved bounds on the compe-
tition complexity. A proof and definition of disjoint spanning number appear in Appendix C, but
we note here that the disjoint spanning number is always at most m− 1.
Theorem 5.6 (Competition complexity for matroids) Let the competition complexity of n
bidders with valuations that are additive over m independent, regular items be X = X(n,m), and
let I be a matroid with disjoint spanning number ρ. Then the competition complexity of n additive
bidders with valuations that are additive subject to constraints I over m independent, regular items
is at most X + ρ.
For distributions that are additive subject to randomly drawn downward-closed constraints, we
obtain the following slightly weaker guarantee on competition complexity (proof in Appendix D).
Theorem 5.7 (Competition complexity for randomly drawn downward closed constraints)
Let the competition complexity of n bidders with additive valuations over m independent, regular
items be X = X(n,m). Then the competition complexity of n bidders with additive valuations
subject to randomly drawn downwards-closed constraints over m independent, regular items is at
most X + 2(m− 1).
Finally, we extend our results to the competition complexity with respect to a poly-time
maximal-in-range mechanism. Specifically, we consider the maximal-in-range mechanism that only
considers allocations that are matchings (i.e. that allocate each bidder at most one item), and
denote this mechanism by VCGUD. Note that VCGUD can be implemented in poly-time. A proof
appears in Appendix D.1.
Theorem 5.8 (Competition complexity with respect to poly-time MIR mechanism) Let
the competition complexity of additive regular bidders be X = X(n,m). Then the competition com-
plexity with respect to VCGUD of n bidders with additive valuations subject to randomly drawn
downwards-closed constraints over m independent regular items is at most X +m− 1.
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6 Discussion and Future Work
We present the first full BK results in multi-dimensional settings, and show that the competition
complexity of n buyers with additive valuations subject to downward-closed feasibility constraints,
over independent, regular items is at most n + 3m − 3, and at least m − 1. For the special case
of additive (with no constraints), the competition complexity is at most n + 2m − 2 and at least
Ω(logm). For those who are approximation-minded in the traditional sense, an easy corollary is
that for fixed m, as n→∞, VCG itself guarantees a 2-approximation to the optimal revenue.13
An obvious open question is to close the gaps in the above bounds, at least in the special case of
additive or unit-demand. Even more concretely: is the right dependence on m for additive bidders
linear or logarithmic (or in between)? Is any dependence on n necessary? The latter is especially
enticing: if the answer is no, then VCG itself approaches the optimal revenue as n→∞.
Another direction is to consider other prior-independent mechanisms in order to get better
guarantees. For instance, maybe the Ω(logm) lower bound can be circumvented by considering a
different prior-independent mechanism, or perhaps the better of two prior independent mechanisms,
a la [3].14 Overall, while we believe our results to already be quite substantial, we strongly feel
there is a wealth of open problems in the direction of competition complexity.
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A Duality Framework
Reduced Forms. Reduced forms are defined for probabilities over type spaces T = ×i∈[n]Ti,
where Ti is the type space of agent i. The reduced form of an auction stores for all bidders i, items
j, and types vi, what is the probability that agent i will receive item j when reporting vi to the
mechanism (over the randomness in the mechanism and randomness in other agents reported types,
assuming they come from F−i) as piij(vi), as well as pi(vi), which is the expected price bidder i pays
when reporting type vi (over the same randomness). It is easy to see that if a buyer that is additive
subject to constraints, his expected value for reporting type v′i to the mechanism is just vi · pii(v′i),
so long as the mechanism only ever awards each type of each bidder a set of items that fit their
constraints (i.e. whenever a type of each bidder is subject to constraints I, the mechanism awards
them a subset of items in I). There always exists an optimal mechanism with this property, and
there is furthermore a trivial transformation to turn any BIC-BIR mechanism without this property
into one with this property that achieves exactly the same revenue (see, e.g. [28]). We say that
a reduced form is feasible if there exists some feasible mechanism that matches the probabilities
promised by the reduced form.15
Definition A.1 (Reworded from [13], Definitions 2 and 3) A mapping λi : Ti × Ti → R+
is flow-conserving if for all v ∈ Ti:
∑
v′∈Ti λi(v, v
′) ≤ fi(v) +
∑
v′∈Ti λi(v
′, v).16 Given λi, the
corresponding virtual value function Φi, is a transformation from vectors in Ti to valuation vectors
in T×i (the closure of Ti under linear combinations) and satisfies:
Φi(v) = v − 1
fi(v)
∑
v′∈Ti
λi(v
′, v)(v′ − v).
Equipped with these definitions we can state the main theorem of the framework from [13].
Theorem A.2 (Revenue ≤ Virtual Welfare [13]) Let λi be flow conserving for all i, and M =
(pi, p) any BIC and BIR mechanism. Then the revenue of M is ≤ the virtual welfare w.r.t. the
virtual value function Φ(·) corresponding to λ. That is:
n∑
i=1
∑
vi∈Ti
fi(vi) · pi(vi) ≤
n∑
i=1
∑
vi∈Ti
fi(vi) · pii(vi) · Φi(vi).
Therefore, the task of finding a good bound reduces to finding good flow conserving duals. In order
to find flow conserving duals we begin with the following definition:
Definition A.3 (Upward-closed region) A region (subset) of types R ⊆ ⋃i Ti is upward closed
with respect to item j if for every vi ∈ R ∩ Ti, all types v′i = (v′ij , vi−j) ∈ Ti such that v′ij ≥ vij, are
also in R. We use Rj to denote an upward-closed region with respect to item j.
A method for designing flow conserving duals is the following: first, partition the type space T into
upward-closed regions. Then, define the duals as follows: for a type vi ∈ Rj ∩ Ti, i.e., in a region
that is upward closed w.r.t. j. Let v′i = (v
′
ij , vi−j) be the type so that v
′
ij is the largest value that
is smaller than vij (if exists). If v
′
i is also in Rj , then set λi(vi, v
′
i) = f(vi) +
∑
vˆi∈Ti λi(vˆi, vi), and
otherwise set λ(vi, v
′
i) = 0. Set all other duals to 0.
Let Φi(·) be the resulting virtual transformation. The following lemma is essentially a restate-
ment of Claims 1 and 2 in [13] to upwards closed regions.
15For a more comprehensive description of reduced forms and their applications, see [13, 9, 10, 11, 12].
16This is equivalent to stating that there exists a λi(v,⊥) ≥ 0 such that λi(v,⊥) +∑v′∈Ti λi(v, v′) = fi(v) +∑
v′∈Ti λi(v
′, v), which might look more similar to the wording of Definition 2 in [13].
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Lemma A.4 ([13]) Let vi ∈ Ti be some valuation for which vi ∈ Rj for some j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Then Φik(vi) = vik if k 6= j and Φij(vi) = ϕij(vij) otherwise.
Using the region-based flow, and assuming each item j has exactly one upward-closed region Rj
associated with it (as is the case throughout the entire paper), we get the following upper bound
on the revenue of any BIR-BIC mechanism.
Theorem A.5 For any set of upward-closed regions R1, . . . , Rm, the optimal revenue a seller can
obtain by a BIC and BIR mechanism is
Rev ≤ max
pi
n∑
i=1
∑
vi∈Ti
m∑
j=1
fi(vi) · piij(vi)
(
ϕij(vij) · Ivi∈Rj + vij · Ivi /∈Rj
)
= max
pi
n∑
i=1
∑
vi∈Ti
m∑
j=1
fi(vi) · piij(vi)
(
ϕij(vij)
+ · Ivi∈Rj + vij · Ivi /∈Rj
)
. (5)
Proof: The inequality is a direct corollary of Theorem A.2 and Lemma A.4, and the equality
follows since the max is achieved whenever piij(vi) = 0 for each vi ∈ Rj such that ϕij(vij) < 0.
A.1 Single Additive Bidder Case
Since there is only a single additive bidder, with no feasibility constraints, the bound in (5) simplifies
to:
Rev ≤
∑
v∈T
∑
j
f(v)
(
ϕj(vj)
+ · Iv∈Rj + vj · Iv/∈Rj
)
= Ev∼F
[ m∑
j=1
(
ϕj(vj)
+ · Iv∈Rj + vj · Iv/∈Rj
) ]
=
m∑
j=1
∑
vj
fj(vj)
(
ϕj(vj)
+ · Pr
v−j
[v ∈ Rj ] + vj · Pr
v−j
[v /∈ Rj ]
)
. (6)
In [13], the regions are defined as follows: Rj contains all valuations v = (v1, . . . , vm) for which
vj > vk for every k 6= j (breaking ties lexicographically). Therefore, they get the following bound:
Rev ≤
∑
j
∑
vj
fj(vj)
(
ϕj(vj)
+ · Pr
v−j
[∀k : vj ≥ vk] + vj · Pr
v−j
[∃k : vj < vk]
)
. (7)
Instead, we define regions as follows: Rj contains all valuations v = (v1, . . . , vm) for which
Fj(vj) > Fk(vk) for every k 6= j (breaking ties lexicographically), and therefore, our single bidder
bound has the form:
Rev ≤
∑
j
∑
vj
fj(vj)
(
ϕj(vj)
+ · Pr
v−j
[∀k : Fj(vj) ≥ Fk(vk)] + vj · Pr
v−j
[∃k : Fj(vj) < Fk(vk)]
)
. (8)
A.2 Multiple Additive Bidder Case
We now present the proof of Theorem 3.4, which is the multiple additive bidder benchmark we use
to prove our main result .
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Proof of Theorem 3.4 Notice that in Equation (5), since there are no feasibility constraints,
piij(·) can allocate each item to the non-negative, maximizing, virtual value. Therefore:
Rev ≤ max
pi
Ev∼Fn
 n∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
piij(vi)
(
ϕij(vij)
+ · Ivi∈Rj + vij · Ivi /∈Rj
)
= Ev∼Fn
 m∑
j=1
max
i∈[n]
(
ϕij(vij)
+ · Ivi∈Rj + vij · Ivi /∈Rj
)
=
m∑
j=1
Ev∼Fn
[
max
i∈[n]
(
ϕij(vij)
+ · Ivi∈Rj + vij · Ivi /∈Rj
)]
.
B Missing Proofs of Section 4
Proof of Observation 4.4: Since the expected revenue of a mechanism is the expected virtual
value of the allocated bidder, the optimal mechanism that always sells an item allocates the item
to the bidder with the highest virtual value. Since the bidders are drawn i.i.d. from a regular
distribution, the bidder with the highest virtual value is also the bidder with the highest value.
Thus, the optimal mechanism that always sells an item allocates the item to the bidder with the
highest value; this is exactly the allocation rule of VCG.
B.1 Proof of Claim 4.5
Before proving the claim, we introduce the following definitions and lemmas.
Definition B.1 Random variable A first-order stochastically dominates (FOSD) random variable
B if for every x, Pr [A > x] ≥ Pr [B > x].
Definition B.2 Consider two random variables X and Y . We say that X,Y are positively corre-
lated if for every x and y, Pr[X > x|Y > y] ≥ Pr[X > x].
(I.e., X|Y >y FOSD X for every y.)
Lemma B.3 If X,Y are positively correlated and Y˜ is independent of X and FOSD Y , then
E[max{X,Y }] ≤ E[max{X, Y˜ }].
Proof: We prove the claim for Ŷ that has exactly the same marginals as Y but is independent
of X. Since Y˜ FOSD Ŷ and both are independent of X, it is immediate that E
[
max{X, Y˜ }
]
≥
E
[
max{X, Ŷ }
]
≥ E [max{X,Y }] as desired. First, notice that
E [max{X,Y }] =
∫ ∞
0
Pr [max{X,Y } > x] dx
=
∫ ∞
0
Pr [X > x] + Pr [Y > x]− Pr [X > x and Y > x] dx, (9)
and similarly
E
[
max{X, Ŷ }
]
=
∫ ∞
0
Pr [X > x] + Pr
[
Ŷ > x
]
− Pr
[
X > x and Ŷ > x
]
dx
=
∫ ∞
0
Pr [X > x] + Pr [Y > x]− Pr
[
X > x and Ŷ > x
]
dx, (10)
27
where the second equality holds since Ŷ and Y have the same marginals. Subtracting (10) from
(9) yields
E [max{X,Y }]− E
[
max{X, Ŷ }
]
=
∫ ∞
0
Pr
[
X > x and Ŷ > x
]
− Pr [X > x and Y > x] dx
=
∫ ∞
0
Pr
[
X > x|Ŷ > x
]
Pr
[
Ŷ > x
]
− Pr [X > x|Y > x] Pr [Y > x] dx
=
∫ ∞
0
Pr [Y > x] (Pr [X > x]− Pr [X > x|Y > x]) dx
≤ 0,
where the third equality follows from the fact that Ŷ has the same marginals as Y and from the
independence of X and Ŷ , and the inequality follows from the fact that X and Y are positively
correlated.
Lemma B.4 For any regular distribution F , and a and b sampled from F ` and F k respectively,
ϕ
(
a(1)
)
|a(1)>b(1) and a(2)|a(1)>b(1) are positively correlated.
Proof: Fix some value of x, and let v be the (highest) value for which ϕ(v) = x, where ϕ is the
virtual valuation function of F . We have
Pr
a∼F `
b∼Fk
[
ϕ
(
a(1)
)
> x | a(1) > b(1)
]
= Pr
a∼F `
b∼Fk
[
a(1) > v | a(1) > b(1)
]
≤ Pr
a∼F `
b∼Fk
[
a(1) > v | a(1) > b(1) ∧ a(1) > y
]
≤ Pr
a∼F `
b∼Fk
[
a(1) > v |a(1) > b(1) ∧ a(2) > y
]
= Pr
a∼F `
b∼Fk
[
ϕ
(
a(1)
)
> x | a(1) > b(1) ∧ a(2) > y
]
,
where the first and last equalities follow by the regularity of F , and the last inequality follows from
the fact that whenever a(2) > y then also a(1) > y. This immediately implies a positive correlation
between ϕ
(
a(1)
)
|a(1)>b(1) and a(2)|a(1)>b(1) .
Lemma B.5 For every distribution F , a and b sampled from F ` and F k and c sampled from
F `+k, c(2) FOSD a(2)|a(1)>b(1).
Proof: Fix some value x in the support of F . We need to show that
Pr
c∼F `+k
[
c(2) > x
] ≥ Pr
a∼F `
b∼Fk
[
a(2) > x | a(1) > b(1)
]
.
For a given vector c sampled from F `+k, let ca be the first ` coordinates of c, and cb be the last k
coordinates. We notice that the event that c(1) resides in the first ` coordinates is independent of
the event that c(2) > x. Therefore,
Pr
c∼F `+k
[
c(2) > x
]
= Pr
c∼F `+k
[
c(2) > x|ca(1) > cb(1)
]
≥ Pr
c∼F `+k
[
ca(2) > x|ca(1) > cb(1)
]
= Pr
a∼F `
b∼Fk
[
a(2) > x | a(1) > b(1)
]
,
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where the inequality follows since whenever ca(2) > x then also c(2) > x, and the last equality follows
by renaming ca to a and cb to b.
Combining the aforementioned three lemmas three lemmas yields the claim.
Proof of Claim 4.5: Consider the random variables X = ϕ
(
a(1)
)
|a(1)>b(1) , Y = a(2)|a(1)>b(1) , and
Yˆ = c(2). By Lemma B.4 X and Y are positively correlated, and by Lemma B.5 Yˆ FOSD Y . In
addition, Yˆ and X are independent. The Claim then follows from Lemma B.3.
C Additive Subject to Matroid Feasibility Constraints
In this section we establish an improved version of Lemma 5.2 for the special case of matroids. We
use the following notation: given a product of regular distributions F and a n′ bidders subject to
identical matroid feasibility constraints, let VCGMatn′ denote the expected VCG revenue from selling
the m items to n′ bidders with i.i.d. values drawn from F , whose valuations are additive subject to
the matroid constraint.
Let ([m], I) be a matroid set system with rank function r. A set S ⊂ M spans an element
j ∈ M \ S if r(S ∪ {j}) = r(S) (i.e., the rank of S does not increase when j is added to it). We
introduce the following parameter ρ of a matroid ([m], I), which we call the matroid’s disjoint
spanning number :
Definition C.1 (Disjoint spanning number) For an element j of the matroid, let a disjoint
spanning collection of j be a family I ′ ⊂ I of disjoint independent sets such that every I ∈ I ′ spans
j. Let ρj denote the maximum size |I ′| over all disjoint spanning collections I ′ of j.17 We define
ρ := maxj{ρj}.
As an example, we state the value of ρ for two kinds of simple matroids:
Example C.1 (Examples of disjoint spanning numbers) For k-uniform matroids where k <
m, ρ = d(m− 1)/ke. For partition matroids, ρ is the size of the largest partition.
We can now state our main lemma for matroids, which shows the extra competition complexity
arising from imposing matroid constraints on additive bidders:
Lemma C.2 (Main lemma for matroids) For every n + ρ bidders with a matroid feasibility
constraint whose maximum disjoint spanning number is ρ, VCGMatn+ρ ≥ VCGAddn .
The proof of Theorem 5.6 is the same as the proof of Theorem 5.1 only with Lemma 5.2 replaced
by Lemma C.2. Before proving Lemma C.2, we briefly discuss its relation to the work of [56] for
the special case of unit-demand bidders.
C.1 Unit-demand Valuations [56]
[56] prove a version of Lemma C.2 for the case of unit-demand bidders. Such bidders can alterna-
tively be described as additive bidders subject to 1-uniform matroid constraints. In particular, [56]
show that VCGUDn+m ≥ VCGAddn+1, which is precisely what we get if we apply Lemma C.2 to 1-uniform
matroids, using that the disjoint spanning number ρ of 1-uniform matroids is equal to m− 1 (Ex-
ample C.1). In fact this is the same inequality shown in Lemma 5.2 for general downward-closed
17For example, in a graphical matroid, ρj would be the maximum number of cycles that share the edge j and are
otherwise disjoint.
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constraints. We conclude that the case of unit-demand bidders is the “hardest” one in terms of
competition complexity, not only among matroids but also among all downward-closed set systems.
We generalize the result of [56] in two ways: first, by extending it to all downward-closed
constraints (Lemma 5.2); second, by introducing a parameterized version for all matroids using
the environment disjoint spanning number as the parameter (Lemma C.2). In terms of techniques,
our result for matroids uses a stability argument similar to that in [56]. Our result for general
downward-closed uses a different charging argument as described in Section 5.2. Both results use
the principle of deferred decision as used in the analysis of [56] in order to argue that the values of
unallocated bidders (which determine VCG payments) are sufficiently high in expectation.
C.2 Proof of Main Lemma (4.3) for Matroids
The next claim will be used in the proof of Lemma C.2. It follows easily from the definitions of
matroid rank function and spanning in matroids.
Claim C.3 Consider a matroid ([m], I). For every subset of elements S ⊆ [m], and for every two
elements j, j′ ∈ [m]\S such that S spans j but does not span j′, S∪{j} does not span j′. Moreover,
for every subset S′ ⊆ S ∪ {j}, S′ does not span j′.
We state the following claim for all gross substitutes valuations, and apply it in the proof of
Lemma C.2 to the subclass of additive valuations subject to matroid constraints. The claim uses
the language of vacated and snatched items as defined in the proof of Lemma 5.2.
Claim C.4 Consider a welfare-maximizing allocation OPT−j of the m− 1 items in M \ {j} to n
bidders with gross substitutes valuations. A welfare-maximizing allocation OPT of the m items in
M to the n bidders can be found by a chain of reallocations starting from OPT−j, where in each
step a bidder snatches either item j (in the first step) or a single vacated item (in subsequent steps),
and possibly vacates another single item.
Proof: [Sketch] Let p−j be a vector of Walrasian prices supporting the welfare-maximizing
allocation OPT−j [38], i.e., each bidder is allocated his demand (utility-maximizing bundle of
items) at prices p−j , and no unallocated item is priced above 0. Now add item j with an initial
price pj that is prohibitively high. We show a descending-price process that transforms OPT−j
into OPT. This process establishes the existence of a chain of reallocations as claimed above (its
computational properties are irrelevant in our context).
Start by lowering pj until there is a single
18 bidder i who is no longer getting his demand or
until pj reaches 0.
19 If pj = 0 we have found OPT (to see this, observe that since each bidder is
allocated his demand given current prices and no item with positive price is unallocated, we have
reached a Walrasian equilibrium whose allocation is welfare-maximizing by the first welfare theorem
[38]). Otherwise, by the single improvement property of gross substitutes [38], and since prices p−j
support the allocation of items M \ j, bidder i can improve his utility by and only by snatching
the single item whose price has been reduced, which in the first step is item j, and then possibly
vacating another single item. If no item is vacated, we have again reached a welfare-maximizing
equilibrium allocation OPT. Otherwise, if an item j′ was vacated, then we repeat the above process
of lowering the price of item j′. This process must end with a welfare-maximizing allocation OPT,
thus completing the proof sketch.
18We are assuming no ties here to simplify the exposition.
19In full formality, pj should be lowered by -increments and  should be taken to 0.
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We now prove our main lemma for matroids.
Proof of Lemma C.2: Our goal is to show that VCGMatn+ρ ≥ VCGAddn . As in the proof of
Lemma 5.2, it is sufficient to identify n out of the n+ρ constrained bidders whose values for item j
are i.i.d. draws from Fj , such that the VCG payment for j is at least as high as the second highest
value of these bidders for j. This establishes that the contribution from selling item j to VCGMatn+ρ
is at least E[u(2:n)j ], which is exactly the contribution from selling item j to VCGAddn .
As in the proof of Lemma 5.2 we fix an item j, and fix the values of the n constrained bidders for
all items but j. We denote the welfare-maximizing allocation of all items but j to the n constrained
bidders by OPT−j . Diverging from the proof of Lemma 5.2, we denote by A the set of bidders
whose allocation in OPT−j spans j. Notice that |A| ≤ ρj ≤ ρ, and so |A¯| ≥ n. We further fix
the values of the bidders in A for item j, so that all remaining randomness is in the values of
bidders in A¯ for item j, which are i.i.d. random samples from Fj . We denote by OPT the random
welfare-maximizing allocation of all items (including j) to the n bidders.
Assume first that item j is allocated in OPT to a bidder i in A¯. As in the proof of Lemma 5.2,
the allocation of the other items in OPT−j does not change in OPT. Since all bidders in A¯ but
i still have allocations that do not span item j, the VCG payment for j is at least as high as the
second-highest value of the bidders in A¯ for j.
Assume now that item j is allocated in OPT to a bidder in A. Note that as in the proof
of Lemma 5.2, we can find OPT without knowing vA¯j (if there are several welfare-maximizing
allocations, we assume that VCG finds the one implied by Claim C.4). By Claim C.4 we know that
the bidders in A¯ have changed their allocation only by “single improvements” involving snatching
an item and possibly vacating another. In fact, in all such single improvement but one, an item
was vacated. Since bidders’ valuations are additive subject to matroid constraints, a bidder i with
allocation Si vacates an item j
′ if and only if he first snatches an item j′′ such that Si spans j′′.
By Claim C.3, this means that the eventual allocation of bidder i in OPT still does not span item
j. We conclude that the VCG payment for j is at least as high as the second-highest value of the
bidders in A¯ for j.
We get that in both cases, the payment for j is at least the second-highest value of the bidders
in A¯. Since the set A¯ is determined before sampling the values for item j, this completes the proof
of the lemma.
D Additive Subject to Asymmetric Downward Closed Feasibility
Constraints
In this section, we consider the case of heterogeneous downward-closed feasibility set systems for
the bidders. Let ([m], Ii) denote the feasibility set system of bidder i. For our results to hold,
we add the mild assumption that {j} ∈ Ii for every bidder i and item j. We first point out the
part where the proof for symmetric feasibility constraints fails. Unlike the case where bidders
have symmetric feasibility constraints, the payment of an bidder is not lower bounded by the sum
of the highest values of the unallocated bidders to the items; this is in contrast to Lemma 5.320.
Therefore, we need a new lower bound on the revenue of VCG. Before stating the new lower bound,
we introduce the following notation. We order the items in lexicographic order, and for a given set
S, we define:
20To see this, consider an additive bidder who is allocated two items, a and b, by the VCG mechanism, and two
unit demand bidders, 1 and 2, where v1(a) = 3, v1(b) = 5, v2(a) = 1, v2(b) = 4. The payment of the additive bidder
is 3 + 4 = 7 < 3 + 5 = 8.
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• 1∗(S) = arg maxi∈S vi(1) (the bidder in set S with the highest value for item 1).
• S>j = S \ {1∗(S), 2∗(S), . . . , j∗(S)}, contains all bidders except for 1∗(S), 2∗(S), . . . , j∗(S).
• j∗(S) = arg maxi∈S>j−1 vi(j).
• rj(S) = vj∗(S)(j) (the value of item j to bidder j∗(S)).
We give a lower bound on the revenue of VCG given the above definitions.
Lemma D.1 Consider a set of bidders with asymmetric downward-closed feasibility constraint,
and the outcome of VCG. Let A¯ be the set of unallocated bidders. Assuming the number of bidders
is at least 2m, the revenue of VCG is at least
∑
j∈[m] rj
(
A¯
)
.
Proof: Let A and A¯ = [n] \ A be the respective sets of allocated and unallocated bidders. Let
S = (S1, . . . , Sn) be the allocation returned by VCG, and let W be the welfare of this allocation.
Fix an agent i that received an item. The welfare of all agents but i for this outcome is W − vi(Si).
Consider now the following allocation — allocate the items not in Si as in S, and distribute each
item j ∈ Si to an unallocated bidder j∗
(
A¯
)
(notice that this is well defined since the number of
agents is assumed to be at least 2m). By construction, j∗(A¯) 6= j′∗(A¯) for every j 6= j′. Therefore,
each bidder in A¯ gets at most a single item, which is feasible under our assumption that {j} ∈ Ii for
every i, j. The welfare of the proposed allocation is W − vi(Si) +
∑
j∈Si rj(A¯). Since we described
some allocation of items to all bidders but i, the welfare of the optimal allocation to bidders without
i is at least as high. In VCG, each agent pays her “externality on the other agents” (i.e., the loss
in welfare of the other agents due to her existence). We get that the payment of bidder i is at least∑
j∈Si rj(A¯). Summing over all bidders completes the proof of the lemma.
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 5.1 and Corollary 5.6, we prove a lemma that shows how
many extra bidders are needed for the revenue of VCG with arbitrary downward closed constrained
bidders to exceed the revenue of VCG with unconstrained bidders. To this end we fix a product
distribution F of m regular distributions, and denote by VCGAsymn′ the expected VCG revenue from
selling m items to n′ ≥ n bidders with i.i.d. values drawn from F , whose valuations are additive
subject to n′ (not-necessarily identical) downward-closed feasibility constraints.
Lemma D.2 For every n+ 2(m− 1) bidders with arbitrary downward closed feasibility constraint,
VCGAsymn+2m−2 ≥ VCGAddn .
Lemma D.2 is useful in its own right, but also can be used to imply a competition complexity
result extending Theorem 5.1 to the case where feasibility constraints are not fixed for the entire
population.
We now prove Lemma D.2, and begin by showing a useful property of the notations used in
order to bound VCG’s revenue.
Lemma D.3 For any two sets of of bidders S and T such that S ⊆ T , and for every j ∈ [m],
S>j−1 ⊆ T>j−1.
Proof: The proof is by induction on j. For j = 1, S>0 = S ⊆ T = T>0. Now suppose the claim
is true for some j
(
S>j−1 ⊆ T>j−1
)
. Consider two cases: if j∗(S) = j∗(T ) (denote this bidder by
j∗), then, by the induction hypothesis,
S>j = S>j−1 − {j∗} ⊆ T>j−1 − {j∗} = T>j ;
otherwise, if j∗(S) 6= j∗(T ), then by the induction hypothesis, j∗(S) ∈ T>j−1, thus j∗(T ) ∈
T>j−1 \ S>j−1. Therefore,
T>j = T>j−1 − {j∗(T )} ⊇ S>j−1 ⊃ S>j .
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As a corollary, we get:
Corollary D.4 For any two sets of of bidders S and T such that S ⊆ T , and for every j ∈ [m],
rj(S) ≤ rj(T ).
Proof: From the above lemma, j∗(S) ∈ T>j−1. Therefore, by the definition of rj , it holds that
rj(T ) ≥ rj(S).
We now prove the main lemma for bidders with asymmetric feasibility constrains.
Proof of Lemma D.2: Let S¯ be the set of bidders unallocated by VCG on the n + 2(m − 2)
constrained bidders. We prove that for every j, the expected value of rj(S¯) is at least as high as
the expectation of the second highest value of n draws from Fj . This argument suffices to prove
the lemma since the latter is exactly what is paid for item j in VCG with unconstrained bidders.
As in previous proofs, the proof uses again the principle of deferred decisions. Consider first
sampling values of all items but j, and then sample the value of item j for all bidders that are
allocated some item in the optimal allocation that does not allocate j. Similarly to the proof of
Lemma 5.2, we can identify a set A˜ of n + m − 1 bidders out of which at most a single bidder
is going to be allocated by VCG. Furthermore, the value of item j for these agents is yet to be
determined. We denote the random set that will be left unallocated after putting item j back in
by A˜+j . Consider the set of bidders A˜<j = {`∗(A˜) : ` < j}. We claim that no matter which bidder
will be allocated from A˜ in the final allocation (if any), all bidders remaining from A˜<j will be in
A˜+j<j = {`∗(A˜+j) : ` < j}. Otherwise, there would be an bidder in A˜+j>j−1 which is not in A˜>j−1,
contradicting Lemma D.3.
Notice now that the set A˜<j is of size at most m − 1, and therefore, the set A˜>j−1 is of size
at least n + m − 1 − (m − 1) = n. Furthermore, the set A˜>j−1 is determined before sampling the
values of item j for these bidders. Since at most a single bidder from A˜>j−1 is in A˜
+j
<j , j
∗(A˜+j) is
one of the two bidders with the highest value for item j in A˜>j−1. Therefore, by Corollary D.4,
rj(S¯) ≥ rj(A˜+j), which is at least the payment for item j in VCG with n unconstrained bidders.
Applying Lemma D.1 gives us that the revenue of VCG with n + 2(m − 1) constrained bidders is
at least the revenue of VCG with n constrained ones, as desired.
Proof of Theorem 5.7: First, draw the constraints independently for each bidder. As constraints
are drawn independently of values, we can apply Lemma D.2, and conclude that for all constraints
that could possibly have been drawn, the expected revenue of VCG for n+2m−2 bidders subject to
these (asymmetric) constraints is at least the expected revenue of n additive bidders, conditioned on
the drawn constraints. Therefore, when taking an expectation over the randomly drawn constraints,
the theorem statement holds.
D.1 Competition Complexity of Maximum in Range VCG
We furthermore show how to overcome the intractability of VCG for general downward-closed
feasibility constraints, even when the constraints are asymmetric across agents. Recall that VCGUD
is defined to run VCG, and restrict the outcomes to matchings – i.e., every agent gets at most a
single item. This is a maximal-in-range mechanism, and hence, truthful. Furthermore, since finding
maximum weight matchings is tractable, this is also a poly-time prior independent mechanism. We
can now ask the following question — what is the the competition complexity of this mechanism
(if well defined).
We first provide a lower bound on the revenue of VCGUD.
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Observation D.5 Consider a set of agents with asymmetric downward-closed feasibility constraint,
and the outcome of VCGUD. For each item j, let v∗j be the highest value of an unallocated agent
for item j. The revenue of VCGUD is at least
∑
j∈[m] v
∗
j .
Proof: Similarly to the proof of Lemma 5.3, this follows from taking the optimal allocation,
removing the agent that is allocated item j, and allocating this item to the unallocated agent with
the highest value for this item.
Notice that we can use this observation, and an essentially identical proof to the proof of Lemmas
5.2 and C.2 (and similar to the claims used in [56]), to show the following:
Lemma D.6 For every n+m−1 bidders with a asymmetric downward closed feasibility constraints,
VCGUDn+m−1 ≥ VCGAddn .
This in turn yields the following upper bound on the competition complexity of VCGUD, that
is, the number of extra bidders one needs to add to the original environment in order the get
revenue greater than the optimal revenue of the original environment using mechanism VCGUD,
and a complete proof of Theorem 5.8.
E Lower Bounds on the Competition Complexity
Theorem E.1 The competition complexity of a single bidder with additive valuations over m in-
dependent regular items is Ω(logm).
Proof: Consider a single additive bidder with m items i.i.d. distributed according to the equal-
revenue distribution with CDF F (x) = 1− 1/x. In Lemma 8 in [39], it was shown that the optimal
revenue for this setting satisfies Rev(Fm) ≥ m · logm/4.
Now consider a setting with a single item and k bidders, all distributed according to F . The
expected revenue of the optimal single-bidder auction is 1. By revenue submodularity [32], the
expected revenue of running the optimal mechanism is a concave function of the number of bidders.
Thus, the expected revenue of the optimal auction with k bidders is at most k (and it can actually
be shown to be exactly k). Consequently, the expected revenue of running VCG in the single item,
k bidder setting is upper bounded by k.
Consider now the original setting with a single additive bidder and m items i.i.d. distributed
according to the equal-revenue distribution. Based on the analysis above, and the linearity of VCG
with additive bidders, the expected revenue of running VCG with k − 1 additional bidders (i.e.,
with k bidders) is at most m · k. Thus, in order to surpass the optimal revenue Rev(Fm), the
number of additional bidders (k − 1) should be at least as large as logm/4 − 1 = Ω(logm). This
establishes the assertion of the theorem.
F 1/2 approximation of VCG as n goes to ∞
Here we show that as a direct corollary of our results, running VCG in large markets yields a
2-approximation on the optimal revenue for additive bidders.
Theorem F.1 For any distribution of regular items F , whenever n  m, then running VCG on
n bidders (without recruiting additional bidders) yields a revenue ≈ half of the optimal revenue.
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Proof: Consider a market with n additive bidders with values sampled from F . According to The-
orems 4.1, VCGAdd2n+m−1 ≥ RevAddn . Since VCG decomposes across items for additive bidders, and
since n > m, revenue submodularity applies [32]. Therefore, VCGAddn ≥ n−m2n+m−1−m VCGAdd2n+m−1 ≥
n−m
2n−1 Rev
Add
n ≈n→∞ RevAddn /2.
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